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1.
Over the past Century, the pastoral populations of Eastern Africa have been
forced to deal with crises of various kinds. Colonial subjection and
'pacification', marginalisation by the postcolonial state, ecological and economie
problems and 'ethnie' tensions have lead to persistent problems in the sphère of
national intégration and simply of survival. At present we may see a soit of
'end-phase' in this process, in that the attempts at politico-économie
incorporation or subjection of these groups can signify either an imminent
destruction of their and socio-cultural fabric and modes of existence (cf. Burton
1994), or a crippling dependence on state or non-governmental aid agencies (cf.
Fratkin 1991 on thé Ariaal).
In the context of the late nineties, the question remains what long-term
effects these crises in state-society relations, politico-cultural discourse,
ecological-economic conditions and in ethnie relations will have. Most likely is
a scenario of more protracted violent conflicts in the pastoral 'fringe régions',
of half-hearten NGO-supported efforts to promote their 'development' (i.e., to
sedentarize and 'peasantize' them), and of a sélective incorporation of
entrepreneurial/semi-criminal elite groups into the national urban-bureaucratic
strata of these countries.
The majority of these agro-pastoral societies1- if not on the verge of
destruction in ethnocide and creeping genocide, as in southern Sudan - will
probably attempt to maintain some economie and cultural autonomy. Although
there is substantial out migration to urban areas, pastoral society is also being
reproduced. They are limited in population but still occupy vast tracts of land.2
1 Excluding here the Arab/lslamic agro-pastoralists of central and northern Sudan
(Baqqara, Humr, Kababish, Missiriya, etc.).




In général, the relation of pastoral societies with the 'outside world' have
proved to be one of structural détérioration. This poses questions as to the
remaining political space and the nature of ethno-religious identities of these
societies within the state arenas to which they nominally belong.
The political dynamics of pastoralist societies have received much attention,
be it from an ethnological point of view (studies of the indigenous socio-political
order), or from a political- economie one (state - local society relations). The
cultural and religieus aspects have been less studied3, although cultural
différence and also oppression were often a concomitant of other inequalities
(cf. Donham 1986: 12-13; Markakis 1994: 225).
While they do not significantly détermine religion and politics on the level
of the contemporary postcolonial states, pastoral groups are seen by state
administrations as sources of instability with a high 'nuisance value'. Some
groups also occupy areas of occasional strategie and economie value (southern
Sudan potential oil sources, Ogaden's natural gas reserves, gold in the Ethiopian
Surma country). A new comparative overview is needed of recent religio-
cultural and political dynamics of these pastoral populations, against the
background of ethnological studies made in an earlier era, where the impact of
political-economic crises, globalization processes, and violent social
transformations was less obvious.
While the title of this contribution mentions 'pastoral societies', this does
not mean that such entities can in all respects be delineated, as 'societies', from
others: there are always cross-cutting contacts and shady boundaries (cf. Schlee
1989). 'Society' here is more referred to in the sense of a named socio-cultural
tradition, the adhérents of which recognize each other as a part of a
'normative/moral Community', a ritual tradition and a political unit. The term
' space ' refers to the (compétitive) domain where political power is forged and
contested, the battleground of state and local society. The space for political
action (any action undertaken by individuals or groups with référence to defined
or perceived 'common purposes' vis-à-vis other groups or state institutions) od
pastoralists is decisively shrinking.
2.
Agro-pastoral peoples in East Africa have played some political rôle in the
colonial and in the post-independence period, either as sources of 'civil unrest
and disturbance' for the authorities, or as part of political and regional rebel
movements4 (cf. Markakis 1987, 1993). But they have never dominated the
national scène. In the 'modernist' project of the post-colonial 'nation-states' -
with ideals of 'cultural unity' and 'national intégration' - pastoral peoples were
not successfully engagea as partners.5 In addition, there was a also a clear
'civilisational' bias against them - their economie practices were condemned,
their cultural practices were often proscribed by national governments, and their
traditions submerged. E.g., large-scale initiation-rituals among the Ethiopian
Sidama and Bor an were forbidden during the Mengistu-regime. Pastoral people
were thus consistently alienated from the state.
In the wake of political-economic marginalisation and social crisis (cf.
Campbell 1993; Markakis 1993), pastoralists were forced into a variety of
responses, ranging from submissive adaptation and violent self-maintenance to
massive flight into neighbouring countries. In all cases, this has brought a
profound restructuring of their socio-cultural organisation and identity. This
process in itself shows aspects of innovation and transformation. Processes of
reinvention and sélective use of 'tradition' for political ends have been described
for many societies, especially in Melanesia and thé Pacific (cf. Keesing 1992).
But such studies are still scarce for Eastern Africa.
3.
In thèse processes, religion may corne to play an increasingly important rôle,
not exclusively in terms of a conversion of pastoralist groups to Christianity or
Islam6, but also in terms of a return to, or reinvention of, thé indigenous ritual
tradition. This had offered them a cosmology and an ideology of thé relationship
between humans and nature. It was connected with rites of passage and often
contained éléments like âge-grade organisation (which has religious-ritual
aspects), spirit possession, divination, priest-like ritual leaders, and prophets.
Traditional cosmologies and political mediatory institutions can continue to
3 A récent collection on religion and politics in East Africa (Hansen and Twaddle 1994)
has no substantial contributions on pastoralist groups.
4 But pastoralist people hâve seldom played a central rôle in guérilla movements with
national ambitions. Exceptions are thé Dinka and Nuer in thé Sudanese civil war, and the
Béni Amer and other Islamic lowland groups in Eritrea, who became supporters of the
Eritrean Liberation Front in 1960 (See Markakis 1987).
5 Except perhaps in thé case of (élite groups of) thé Maasai and Kalenjin in Moi's
Kenya, and, obviously, the Afar and Issa in Djibouti.
6 Both problematic. See for example Beswick (1994), claiming that the Dinka pastoral
lifestyle could not accomodate Islam, despite centuries of contact.
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provide sources for thé redéfinition of power, authority, social order, and
political identity of thé group (cf. Behrend 1993, 1995; Prunier 1993; Hamer
1977). Not only the state bas influenced this. Also the présence of the Catholic
and Protestant missions and thé Islamic conversion campaigns have had a
shaping impact on the religieus dynamics in Eastern Africa. Even if in thé
pastoral areas mentioned above, thé présence of missionaries and the
pastoralists' receptivity to thé monotheistic message has not been overwhelming
(except, in historie times, in Somalia), this message has been heard there for a
long time, and has in some ways become a frame of référence.7
Another factor stimulating thé reorganisation of tradition and thé forging of
new models of political action is ethnicity, the représentations referring to
shared ideas of historica! origin, descent, and cultural style. It has been seized
upon in the last few decades in the wake of state crisis and 'resource
compétition' in a wide sensé (population growth, shrinking pastures, drought
and famine conditions). Obviously, ethnie identification is now a major
ideological idiom of political action, though it is not its cause. In some
countries, 'ethnicization' is being stimulated from above, with ethnie identity
becoming the framework of 'official politics' (Ethiopia), or, as elsewhere, thé
de facto discourse of divisive politics (Kenya). How ethnie identification fits in
with religieus factors is not always clear. Neither is the future development of
thé collective identity of thèse pastoral polities predictable. Far too often there
is an assumption that they will automatically be drawn into thé 'gréât traditions'
of Christianity or Islam so as to broaden their support base both materially and
ideologically. But, in thé face of thé visible failure and fragmentation of the
state and thé poor institutional structures of civil society, they will also be
inclined to revert to models and ideas from their own ethnic-indigenous, often
already monotheist and ritually very complex, tradition in a bid to negotiate their
autonomy and group identity within an uncertain political space.
4.
The pastoral societies of the East African région, while varied in nature and
social organisation, still show some common characteristics with regard to
religion and political System.
a) A first element in pastoral societies of thé région is obviousy thé segmertiary
principle, on the basis of moiety, clan, or lineage. Regardless of the fact
7 A füll study of thé impact of thé missions among, specifically, thé pastoralist peoples
of Eastern Africa still remains to be undertaken.
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whether Systems of balanced segmentary opposition 'exist' in thé form so
imaginatively described by, e.g., Evans-Pritchard (The Nuer, 1940), it has
become clear in thé Somali civil war as well as in southern Sudan (with thé
splintering of the SPLA in varions Nuer and Dinka sections along 'tribal lines')
and among some Ethiopian Oromo and Somali groups, that segmentary group
identities are very much alive as organizing vessels of historical consciousness
(see also Schlee 1989) or group identity .
This may even hold for smaller ethnie groups, such as thé Ethiopian Surma.
In 1993, this group was caught up in a serious violent conflict with their
agricultural neighbours (Dizi), as well as with thé Ethiopian state authorities.
Local soldiers of thé new EPRDF-government tried to deal with thé problems,
but did not make much headway. At one point, Londosa, a chief ritual leader
of thé Surma (Chai), declared that he would no longer deal with "small-time,
insignificant soldiers" who "just happened to be sent there" by thé central
government. He demanded to be received by thé new Ethiopian président Mêles
Zenawi himself. For Mm, this was the only person to deal with, being
'structurally equal' to himself in thé political System as he saw it: he as thé
représentative of thé Surma polity, Mêles as that of thé Ethiopian highland state,
successor of thé Dergue régime. Of course, Mêles did not corne, and thé
conflict was 'resolved' with thé force of arms in late 1993.
In général, however, it is unlikely that thé segmentary principle can act as
a uniting force for distinct pastoral peoples. The démise of Somalia, and of a
united SPLA are perhaps examples of the disintegrating force of segmentation,
which has now proceeded to destroy thé overarching common framework.
b) Political life within most pastoral societies in thé région is still regulated by
forms ofage- or génération-grade organisation, which, for instance, means that
one age-group of initiated (male) elders is in a position of normative authority.
Usually a younger 'warrior grade' is below it, entrusted with defence and
raiding activities. Thèse structures have been described by, e.g., Almagor and
Baxter (1978), Spencer (1988), Tornay (1989), and Lamphear (1992). Age-
organisation can in many respects be considered as a special model for ordering
political life and for constructing authority, combining (gendered) democracy
with hierarchy. In combination with thé segmentary principle, it générâtes a
system not primarily geared to expansion but to stable reproduction and
structural equality vis-à-vis outsider groups, including the state8. Among groups
such as thé Boran, an elaborate cosmology is an integrated part of the âge
8 Exceptions are perhaps thé 19th Century Nuer and thé Maasai, who saw a long phase
of démographie and territorial expansion.
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organisation, delimitîng certain ritual cycles within thé socio-political
organisation itself.
Due to political and économie upheavals, reinforced by drought conditions,
population growth and land scarcity, thèse structures corne under sévère stress.
Ethnie and ritual-religious factors may then enter as éléments of group
realignment and 'resource compétition', but thé recourse to thé gréât
monotheistic religieus idéologies is limited. What such pastoral groups in crisis
will often explore first is the potential of their own cultural héritage, as feasible
in their local conditions. Several groups have been relatively successful in this
effort. The best historical example is perhaps that of the Turkana, who, for
some period, developed an efficient and unprecedented military organisation in
their confrontation with the British colonial power in Kenya. It was based on
diviner-prophets and the age-set system (the rara-grade). (cf. Lamphear 1992).
c) Religion was localized, based on the idea of ordering the relations between
humans and nature. It has not prominently figured as a vehicle for political
mobilisation among agro-pastoral groups in East Africa, neither in the colonial
era nor in the post-independence period. But traditionally, the rôle of ritual
mediators, 'priests', or prophets has been notable among them. The Nuer had
their 'leopard-skin chiefs' or earth-masters (kuaar muori), the Dinka their
'masters of the fishing-spear' (beny bith), and the Surma their komoru (a kind
of ritual figurehead). Prophets were common religieus agents in several
societies, such as the Nuer (cf. Johnson 1994), Maasai (Waller 1995) and
Samburu (Fratkin 1979), and also traditional foei of leadership, reconciliation
and rébellion, brought out fully in tunes of sévère crisis. In other societies, such
as the Somali, there were the marabout-like saints, but these never had a real
trans-regional following. Also, due to its universality among the Somali, Islam
never became a vehicle of political protest, as among some groups in Ethiopia
(such as the Arsi Oromo in their résistance to Abyssinian-Christian domination;
cf. Abbas Haji 1993: 16). In Somalia this only happened in the time of the
British and Italian colonial présence in the early decades of this Century, when
a new type of leader, combining religious and political functions, emerged in the
person of Mohamed Abdilleh Hassan. In the independence period, Islamic
identity, in its 'fundamentalist', or better 'revivalist', shape, emerged only in
the recent civil war, probably in an attempt to supersede both the perceived
threat to 'Somali culture' from 'foreign influences', as well as the segmentary
principle, which had led Somalia to the brink of destruction.9 In Ethiopia,
9 The present 'war lords' in Mogadishu and some other urban areas are, in a sense, the
last product of this segmentary fission of Somali society, but they cannot build up any
traditional authority or religious prestige, and can never attain long-term acceptance or
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however, the Ogaden Somalis mobilized largely under the banner of Islam to
resist on account of economie and political oppression (cf. Markakis 1987:
191f.), and united with Islamic Arsi Oromos.
But in général, the pastoral peoples - insofar as they still can be seen as
collectivities - rarely revert to ritual and religious practices with a wider political
aim, e.g. toward national political arenas. The latter are of very recent date
anyhow. The religious-ritual structures of pastoral peoples do indeed contain a
political or a power ideology (cf. Tornay 1989), but it is a 'defensive' ideology:
geared toward keeping a balance in ecological conditions (rains, pasture,
fertility) and in the socio-political or cosmological order. Hence, heir prime
concern is to maintain or restore the integrity of their own way of life vis-à-vis
others, and not to reform state societies of which they are considered a part, nor
to form a state of their own (cf. Markakis 1987: 16).
It is plausible to argue that the principles of clan segmentation, age-group
structure, the ritual-cyclical ordering of community life, and decentralized,
regionally exercised power will remain more important organizing éléments for
pastoral societies than the purely ideological-religious factors10, although the two
are not unconnected (cf. Fratkin 1979: 64). This is a predictable resuit of certain
macro-conditions such as their necessary confinement to marginal areas, thé
geographical mobility, and their lack of intégration into thé wider state society
in terms of literacy, economie surplus extraction, social mobility, or political
représentation.
5.
In this context, comparative research on thé various agro-pastoral groups and
their 'stratégies' in terms of religious response and political action within thèse
macro-conditions (which show important similarities across East African
countries) is imperative, e.g., in order to arrive at models of pastoral politico-
religious action. Some groups would be on the 'traditional' end of the
typological continuüm of politico-religious action, such as thé Surma or thé
Boran (Ethiopia), others on thé 'modem' end, e.g., thé Somali (with the state
expérience and thé pervasive impact of 'globalization' forces) or thé Turkana
legitimacy.
10 Unless massive externally financed religious conversion or propaganda campaigns are
set up - as seems to be done by certain Saudi Arabian and Iranian groups in Kenya, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria.
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(more missionized, more économie development schemes and Kenyan state and
NGO influence).
In what follows, however, we confine ourselves to a considération of a few
groups, one of which was the object of field research in the past years.
a) Accommodation andflexibility: the Boran
The Boran in Ethiopia and Kenya form a large pastoral group of several hundred
thousand, with their complex religious-ritual structure largely intact. They were
militarily and economically thé dominant group in thé région in pré-colonial
rimes (up to ça. 1900), involved in thé régional long-distance trade to thé coast,
e.g., with Somalis and Kenyans. Important aspects of their sociocultural
organisation are thé âge- and generation-set system (gaada) and their ritual-
cosmological cycles (well described by Baxter, Haberland, Asmarom Legesse,
Bassi, and others). The segmentary principle is présent in that îhey are also
organized m clans and moieties.
While there is scholarly dispute over whether or not the gaada system had
mainly politica! functions in the past (as a vehicle for recruitment of warriors
(in thé raàba grade) and thus for expansion,11 it certainly combined several
organisational purposes. It encoded a world view, models of personal social
identity, and a balanced relationship with the natural environment (e.g., via
population control rules). It had thus religious and community functions (Baxter,
ibid.) which characterized thé Boran way of life as opposed to others. The
discussion over the fact of the military rôle of thé gaada (in the context of which
the notorious 'killer complex' of the Boran was developed) shows that the
system was part of a flexible and accomodative response of Boran society to
outside developments. In 1988, for example, the great pan-Boran gaada-
assembly (Schlee 1994: 980) discussed whether the old requirement to 'kill an
enemy' in order to ritually qualify for initiation in a grade could be rescinded.
Although most Boran follow their traditional religion, there are also
Christian and Islamic Boran groups12, or other Oromo-speaking Islamic groups
(Garre, Degodia). This leads to a confusion of 'ethnie' and religious
identification. Religious identity tends more to become a basis for group identity
11 P. Baxter (1978: 178) thinks that the gaada had no pervasive political and other
practical functions. This is certainly true for for the 20th Century. It is, however, very
likely that after the lóth Century reorganisation of the gaada, bringing in line ideal and
actual âges of the new sets, a large dass of young warriors (raaba) was created which
allowed the Oromo to expand spectacularly (cf. Schlee 1994: 979).
12 E.g., the Isiolo-Boran in Kenya converted to Islam in the early decades of this Century.
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and mobilization: e.g., in the earlier-mentioned conflict with the Arsi Oromo
(in league with the expanding Somali) in the 1960s, the common ethnicity of the
Boran äs Oromo proved to be superseded by religious factor: Islam versus
traditional religion. The Arsi, then as in 1941-42, sided with the Somali (see
Markakis 1987: 195). In thé ethnie rebel movements of the 1970s and 1980s,
these groups were strongly represented (SALF, OALF), although they were
partly coopted by the Somali government in its drive to undermine Ethiopian
state authority.
In modem tunes, the Boran gaada organisation did not serve as a rallying
point for political rébellion against oppressive state authorities, such as the
Mengistu regime. The Boran tried to accomodate and keep alive their own ritual
cycles, bypassing or modifying state directives on the basis of éléments form
their own social organisation (cf. Hogg 1993: 63, 69, 81).
After the change of power in Addis Ababa in 1991, a confusing and violent
period of identity struggle and ethno-religious conflict broke out (cf. Schlee
1994), in which Boran traditional religion became a renewed focus of identity
not only vis-à-vis Islamic Somali, Gabbra and Garre but also vis-à-vis other
'Oromo' - including even the OLF people. In the discussion about the future
status of religious affiliations in a more autonomous or state-like structure
('Oromia'), the question becomes how the traditional Boran religion as well as
Islam (both with political implications) could be reconciled in such an 'all-
Oromo entity' which needs to be secular to accomodate all groups (Cf. Schlee's
highly interesting discussion, 1994: 986). Up to now, traditional Boran religion
could find an accomodative form under various state arrangements (Haile
Sellassie, Dergué), but, ironically, in the new political context of forced ethnie
identity and of competing religious allegiances this may become increasingly
problematic. Local-level instability will be the result.
b) Disengagement and polarization: the Nuer
The Nuer, a large pastoralist people who live both in Sudan and Ethiopia, are
going through probably the most turbulent and destructive period of their
existence. During the confrontation with 19th Century Egyptian expansion in the
Sudan (Muhamad Ali's government) as well as in the time of the Mahdist
revolts they had suffered onslaughts (slave-raiding, cattle raids, killings), but
were also able to significantly expand their territory at the cost of the Dinka and
Anuak. Under British colonial administration in the early decades of this
century, several Nuer revolts were violently suppressed, and systematic efforts
were made to eliminate their prophets, such as killing Guek Ngundeng and Dak
Dhon, and imprisoning Kolang Keth or Pok Kerjiok for life (cf. Johnson 1994:
199, 230, 330).
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But the worst period was to be thé présent civil war, raging since 1983.
Since independence in 1956, Arab-Islamic led national governments in Sudan
have succeeded in fully alienating thé non-Islamic groups from thé national
political arena, culminating into a wholesale campaign to root out traditional
religions and Nilotic cultures. While some Nuer groups (e.g., Lou, Gaajak)
hâve also occasionally been led to cooperate with thé National government
against rival (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk) groups within the southern rebel movement
SPLA, there seems to be no doubt about the ultimate strategie aims of the
government: complete Islamization and Arabization of all southern Sudan. In
thèse conditions of external threat and social upheaval, thé prophets, people
possessed by a spirit or a divinity, hâve continued to be rallying points in Nuer
life, expressing central religious and social values (despite that they ail stand in
thé shadow of their gréât predecessors, such as Ngundeng Bong, who died in
1906. Cf. Johnson 1994: 329).
In thé course of this war, Nuer society and religion have taken on a more
militant character than ever. The prophets have been emerging both as full-
fledged war leaders and as political mediators, although, as Johnson stresses
(1994: 326), thé war did not create them. Evans-Pritchard (in thé 1930s) had
rightly described thé prophets as indigenous political leaders, but he also pointed
to their rôle as predominantly religious authorities. In this capacity they are of
continued relevance in the present conflict, both within the Nuer society as well
as outside it (Johnson 1994: 324-25, 348), and much of the conflict itself is still
interpreted by thé Nuer in ternis of thé comments and prédictions of the earlier
génération of prophets. In addition, we may say that thé ideological and political
structure of Nuer society itself will, of necessity, always générale prophets, as
healers, mediators, or controllers of spirits. A purely 'secular' identification of
Nuer, as distinct from their traditional religious héritage, will be unlikely.13
c) Sélective autonomy: thé Surma
This southern Ethiopian group (two subgroups: ça. 18,000 Chai; ça. 10,000
Tirma), living south of Maji town near thé Sudanese border. They inhabit a
remote, drought-prone but fertile lowland area, good for livestock-herding. The
Surma are a segmentary society on the basis of clan identities, have territorial
sections and an âge-grade structure. Three ritual leaders (komoru) from three
hereditary clan lines, fonction as religious, priest-like mediator figures and as
'rain-masters'. The Surma have been noted for their drive for independence and
autonomy vis-à-vis their agriculturalist neighbours in thé highlands as well as thé
13 Riek Machar, thé leader of thé break-away Nuer (Nasir) faction of thé SPLA is a
lineal descendant of thé first prophet of thé 'free-divinity' TENY (Johnson 1994: 346).
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Ethiopian state, although they remain dépendent on local markets for trading
cattle, iron tools, food products, and more recently gold and ammunition. The
attempt at political incorporation of thé Surma in thé Ethiopian state starled only
after 1941, when Haile Sellassie returned from exile. A kind of 'tributary'
structure was all that was achieved. Until 1967, thé Surma paid some taxes (in
kind), and were patrolled by a nominal police force until thé early 1980s. Under
thé Dergue, they initially received some veterinary assistance, médical care and
primary éducation, but thèse services dissolved in thé 1980s.
In thé 1970s and 1980s, thé relations of thé Surma with neighbouring groups
(Nyangatom, Dizi, Anuak), and later also with the Ethiopian government,
deteriorated sharply, as a resuit of a combination of factors: 1. the escalating
Sudanese civil war, which brought about population movements and a large
clandestine influx of automatic rifles and ammunition, 2. cattle disease (e.g.,
anthrax) and diminishing pastures, 3. drought and famine (1984-85). Violent
local conflict in the mid-1980s led the Surma (both Chai and Tirma) away from
their ancestral areas near Mt. Shulugui (or Naita) and thé Tirma Range.
Encroachment on lands of thé (Omotic-speaking) sedentary Dizi people led to
numerous violent incidents, while thé massive availability of automatic rifles
precipitated raiding and robbery on traders, teachers and travellers. This was
perpetrated especially by members of thé 'warrior-grade' (thé tègay), thé
uninitiated 'youngsters', who capitalized on their newly-won power so much that
they threatened thé social equilibrium within Surma society itself: it led to
autonomous violent action, sanctioned by neither the elders of the 'reigning'
âge-grade (róra) nor by thé religious chief, thé komoru (cf. Abbink 1994). They
also undermined thé age-old ritual agreement (based on common sacrifice)
which existed between thé Dizi chiefs and thé Surma, which meant that thé
latter could apply to thé former to perform rain-rites in times of serious drought.
This upsurge in violence coincided with tensions in thé âge-grade System. The
reign of the wró-grade (called Neebi) had been expected to end in the early
1980s, and thé initiation of a new set was long overdue. An additional anomaly
was that thé présent komoru was also still a 'youngster' (tègay), while he should
be a rorà, to enhance his authority. He could only exert little restraining
influence on his âge-mates, as his position was structurally equal to them, not
above them. Thus, his 'religious position', as mediator between thé Sky-God
and humans (guaranteeing his being a conduit for rain, growth, fertility, order,
etc.), was eclipsed by thé demands of thé âge-set system.14 The ongoing
14 The impact of a Christian mission station (with foreign and Ethiopian members) in
thé Surma area has been marginal in thé five years of ils existence. Surma hâve no serious
interest in thé Christian message, which is seen as being irrelevant to their culture, life-
style and mentality.
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violence led to a crisis in Surma society in which it even looked doubtful
whether a new age-set ceremony would ever be held.
The enduring problems with the Dizi people finally led to a confrontation
with the state authorities, who sent in soldiers m 1992-93 to deal with the
'Surma problem'. A battle in October 1993 made hundreds of Surma (Chai)
victims. It also appeared to tone down the violence of the règoy-grade. A year
later, the Chai Surma elders decided to organize the initiation ceremony for a
new róra age-set (cf. Abbink 1997), thereby 'abdicating' their own collective
power. This could be seen as an attempt to set the stage for a reordering of
Surma society in the face of external threats to their continued autonomous
existence.
6.
Pastoral societies, by nature located in ecological and economie fringe-areas,
will form an enduring, irresolvable challenge for national political structures in
Eastern Africa. None of the countries has really succeeded in involving thèse
groups in national 'decision-making processes', nor has envisagea a future for
them as nomadic pastoralists. Even less so is there a valuation of their cultural
and religious traditions. But thèse societies will also - provided they can
maintain a sufficient measure of économie viability - be a challenge for
themselves, obliged to find novel ways of cultural survival in a world which
failed its promises.
The modernist ideals of the nation-state and of 'national intégration' (posed
by an earlier génération of politicians and scholars, cf. Yohannis 1979: 283f.)
may now be a thing of the past, but thé question as to thé forms of
accommodation and of a modus vivendi between states - or what remains of
them - and pastoral societies wishing to retain sortie of their autonomy is still
valid. It has never been suffïciently recognized, neither by state élites nor by
scholars, that pastoral groups, next to différent political-economic interests, will
have strongly different cultural commitments. Religion and ritual do form an
important part of thèse, but not in any predictable ways. The study of this thème
will entail more than just a history of thé 'expansion' of Christianity or Islam
in thèse areas (cf. Chrétien 1993: 7-8), because 'traditional practices' form an
active element in the ongoing processes of identity formation and political
struggle. The religious imagination in a fragmented, globalized world goes well
beyond thé canonical forms of Christian and Islamic monotheism, which
accommodate pluralism only with gréât difficulty. Traditional religious forms
also defïne thé realm oflegitimacy of claims to political authority in states or
post-state societies, and for this reason alone remain of vital importance.
12
The Shrinkine Cultural
We conclude that at least two developments among pastoral peoples of East
Africa will continue to stand out:
Religious-ritual responses as 'stratégies of meaning' in conditions of
upheaval. Islamic or Christian éléments will be utilized, but appropriated
and used in combination with éléments from their own ritual cycles - as
thèse remain organisationally relevant for their society. Religious 'crisis-
movements' (cf. thé Alice Lakwena phenomenon) will continue to émerge,
drawing upon thé rieh regional traditions of prophets and ritual mediators
(cf. Anderson and Johnson 1995). The impact of globalization, in the spread
of technology (also arms) and ideas or fragments of idéologies, increasing
everywhere in Africa, will be felt and lead to a transformation of religious-
cultic expression in discourse and practice. There will also be a continuing
interface between segmentary or descent ideas - culturally constructed - and
religious-political symbols, as thèse can serve as idioms to claim rights,
both in a material and ideological sensé.
Due to thé général insecurity of existence, thé environmental threats, state
incapacity or neglect, and the spread of weapons and ammunition, thé
option of violence, either as local rébellion against state encroachment or as
a regulär but more aggressive extension of traditional raiding practices, will
always remain strong in pastoralist East Africa. Macro-political factors,
mentioned above, may thus contribute to thé development and maintenance
of 'cultures of violence', where thé instrumental use of force will eventually
be corne to be encoded in expressive cultural practices themselves (cf.
Abbink 1993, 1994). As part of this, military and religious functions may
occasionally be merged, as we know is the case with some Nuer prophets
involved in thé current Southern Sudanese war.
Ultimately, understanding thé models of human agency which forge new
cultural forms against the background of the domestic crises, critical material
conditions, and global social forces which affect them is the greatest challenge
m thé study of the changing identity and political space of pastoralist peoples.
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